Strategic Priorities in US Foreign Policy
The Biden administration is currently engaged in a vigorous diplomatic effort, in collaboration with the United Nations, to resolve the long-standing Maghreb conflict before the end of the year. This initiative is founded on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2797, which endorses granting the Sahara region autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. This plan also includes dismantling the Tindouf camps and facilitating the return of their residents to Morocco.
According to informed American sources, resolving this decades-old dispute has become a strategic priority in Washington, not merely due to Maghreb interests but also because of its direct implications for American national security in three interlinked environments: the Middle East, Africa, and the southern Mediterranean. These sources argue that the ongoing conflict creates a fertile ground for the expansion of Iranian influence across the region.
Significantly, there is a notable synchronization between the commencement of negotiations between Lebanese and Israeli delegations, facilitated by President Biden, and the sessions of the UN Security Council focused on the Sahara issue. The Security Council held two closed sessions on April 24 and 30, centered on ending this dispute, dismantling the camps, and disarming the "Polisario Front," which some American factions accuse of receiving training and weapons through channels associated with Hezbollah, although these allegations have yet to be substantiated with documented evidence.
Despite the differing contexts and details surrounding the Arab East and North African issues, they intersect within a new strategic security framework that the US is rapidly establishing. This framework is predicated on a central principle: limiting negotiations and dealings to legitimate states and governments while excluding non-state actors—whether they are armed factions of a religious nature or politically motivated movements that claim legitimacy outside internationally recognized institutional frameworks—from major settlement equations.
In this context, Iran is perceived as a supporter of Hezbollah, which implies that the Lebanese arena has become a pawn in a broader regional equation that does not necessarily serve purely Lebanese interests. When addressing the Western Sahara issue, analytical circles have raised questions about the nature of the relationship between Tehran and the Polisario Front, especially given the historical tensions between Iran and Morocco, particularly in the post-Iranian revolution phase.
Ultimately, it appears that Washington prefers to engage directly with Morocco and Algeria as the primary parties involved in this protracted dispute, which intertwines the remnants of the Cold War with regional power dynamics between two competing neighbors. This trajectory reflects an American conviction that any lasting resolution can only be achieved through the directly involved parties, free from the agendas of external powers.
Complex Regional Files
European capitals recognize that "stability in Lebanon and a resolution to the Moroccan Sahara dispute would weaken Iranian influence throughout the Middle East and North Africa." Paris believes that strengthening the legitimate state in Lebanon, launching reconstruction projects, and restoring the economic, political, and tourism roles of Lebanon to their pre-1983 status would render the Middle East more secure, stable, and prosperous. In the Maghreb, resolving the Sahara issue opens the door to reviving the historical integration project of successive generations.
Informed sources indicate that reaching a settlement for the protracted North African conflict could alleviate the burdens on the American administration concerning more complex regional issues, primarily reducing Hezbollah's military influence and allowing for a more independent Lebanese role in the new Middle Eastern framework that Washington is attempting to outline. In this context, Republican Senator Ted Cruz has warned that the growing Iranian network of relationships with armed factions in the Sahel and North Africa could transform the region into a breeding ground for armed groups similar to the Houthis in Yemen. Cruz argues that a strategic defeat of Iran necessitates first dismantling its regional extensions and neutralizing traditional resistance states in its vicinity, including Algeria.
Recent developments in the Sahel region underscore the high stakes involved; northern Mali has witnessed intense clashes between Malian army forces and a militia coalition that includes the separatist "Azawad Movement" and elements from the "Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims," resulting in hundreds of casualties and the seizure of towns and villages in the north following the withdrawal of Russian Wagner forces from the area. This conflict cannot be viewed in isolation; the region has become a battleground for proxy wars involving multiple international and regional agendas, all eyeing mineral wealth, energy resources, and strategic trade routes. This makes security in the Sahel intrinsically linked to broader geopolitical equations that extend from Europe's Mediterranean shores, which are keen on securing energy and migration routes, to Washington, which seeks to redraw the balance of influence throughout the region.
As reported by majalla.com.
